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Interview with Richard J. Bernstein
Roberto Frega, Giovanni Maddalena and Richard J. Bernstein
 Roberto FREGA & Giovanni MADDELENA – Can you recollect what the situation was concerning
the study of pragmatism when you were in college?
Richard J. BERNSTEIN – I was an undergraduate at the University of Chicago from 1949
to 1951. At the time the “Hutchins College” was an unusual institution. The entire
curriculum was fixed and it was organized around reading many of the great books of
the Western tradition. From the time I arrived, I was reading Plato, Aristotle, Galileo,
Darwin, Herodotus, Thucydides and many other great books. In the undergraduate
college there was a negative attitude toward pragmatism. I don’t recall ever reading
any of the classical pragmatic thinkers. Undergraduate education in the United States
is very different from European education. I had a general liberal education – not a
specialized philosophical one.
 R. F. & G. M. – What was the University of Chicago like when you were a student there in
1949-51?
Richard J. BERNSTEIN – I was an undergraduate and I had no contact with the graduate
philosophy department. But if you consider the careers of those who were students at
Chicago,  it  is  an extraordinary group.  For  example,  Susan Sontag,  Richard Rorty,
George Steiner, Philip Roth – and even Mike Nichols were at Chicago. The faculty too
was very distinguished. It was an exciting intellectual and creative environment. The
University of Chicago was one of the most exciting intellectual institutions at the
time when I was an undergraduate.
 R. F. & G. M. – What was your first encounter with pragmatism?
Richard J. BERNSTEIN – The first encounter that I had with pragmatism was when I
went to study at Columbia University. I enrolled in a course with Justus Buchler. This
is  the  first  time  that  I  read  the  writings  of  Peirce.  But  I  wasn’t  interested  in
pragmatism at the time. I started my graduate studies at Yale in 1953. John E. Smith
(who was then a young assistant professor) organized a small reading group dealing
with John Dewey’s Experience and Nature. This was a revelation for me. I discovered
that Dewey was a far more interesting thinker than I had been led to believe. At the
time there was a prevailing prejudice that pragmatism was little more than a fuzzy
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anticipation of logical positivism. I decided to write my dissertation on “John Dewey’s
Metaphysics  of  Experience”.  One of  my earliest  publications  was  an anthology of
Dewey’s  writings  that  dealt  with  metaphysical  issues,  On  Experience,  Nature  and
Freedom. This was a time before we had a critical edition of Dewey’s works.
Paul Weiss, one of the editors of the Collected Papers of Charles S. Peirce was on the Yale
faculty. So there was also great interest in the work of Peirce. My book, Perspectives on
Peirce was based on a series of lectures given by members of the Yale faculty.
 R. F.  &  G.  M.  –  What  was  studied  at  other  universities?  Positivism  and  early  Analytic
Philosophy?
Richard J. BERNSTEIN – During the period just after World War II, a quiet but radical
revolution  in  philosophy  in  America  was  taking  place.  There  was  an  enormous
influence of the émigré philosophers who came to the United States during the 1930s.
Many of them were associated with the Vienna Circle including Hans Reichenbach,
Rudolph  Carnap,  Herbert  Feigl,  Carl  Hempel,  Alfred  Tarski –  and  many  others
sympathetic  with  logical  empiricism.  They  had  a  growing  influence  on  graduate
philosophy curriculum. In addition, this was also the time of the highpoint of Oxford
ordinary language philosophy as well as the work of Wittgenstein and J. L. Austin.
Many  prestigious  graduate  departments  were  reshaping  themselves  into  analytic
departments heavily influenced by the linguistic turn. Interest in classical American
pragmatism was at an all-time low.
 R. F. & G. M. – Did you expect pragmatism to be different?
Richard J. BERNSTEIN – Before I read Dewey and Peirce seriously I had assimilated the
common prejudice that positivism and logical empiricism were more “sophisticated”
forms of pragmatism. But the more I studied classical pragmatism the more I realized
that it was very different from logical positivism. My first teaching position was at
Yale and I met Wilfrid Sellars when he joined the Yale faculty. I attended many of his
seminars. Sellars taught me to respect the best work in analytic philosophy, and I was
also  struck  by  how  Sellars’  philosophic  writings  were  also  close  in  spirit  to
pragmatism.
 R. F. & G. M. – Did you consider yourself to be a pragmatist at the time?
Richard J. BERNSTEIN – Frankly, I have never considered myself to be any kind of “ist”
although of course I have been greatly influenced by the pragmatic thinkers. I have
always  been  interested  in  a  variety  of  thinkers  both  in  the  Anglo-American  and
Continental  traditions.  Because  I  have  written  on  the  pragmatists  as  well  as
Wittgenstein, Arendt, Habermas, Heidegger, Gadamer, Derrida, Foucault (and many
others), some people think that I set out to build bridges between different traditions.
But from the time that I was a graduate student I have thought that there is only
good and bad philosophy (and there is plenty of both on both sides of the Atlantic).
When I first started working on the pragmatic thinkers, I  thought that they were
actually ahead of their time. And I think this is evident today. Many of the themes
that were fundamental to the classical pragmatic thinkers have become central in
philosophy today.
 
Interview with Richard J. Bernstein
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VI-1 | 2014
2
R. F. & G. M. – So you are saying that understanding philosophy as a sort of “constellation”1 
was  not  only  typical  of  your  work  but  also  typical  of  Yale  philosophy  because  it  was
pluralist?
Richard J.  BERNSTEIN –  I  appropriated the idea of a constellation from the work of
Adorno and Benjamin. But I do think the pluralist approach to philosophy at Yale had
a great influence on me. I remember being as excited and stimulated by Hegel as I
was by Wittgenstein. At the time there was a prejudice in many American philosophy
departments that the “linguistic turn” completely transformed philosophy and that
there was no need to study the history of philosophy. I never shared this prejudice.
What  made  Yale  so  distinctive  at  the  time  was  an  open  pluralist  approach  to
philosophy (although there was a bias against analytic philosophy) and the talent of
the graduate students – including Richard Rorty. It was Dick Rorty and his first wife
Amelie Rorty (I knew both of them at Chicago) that convinced me to pursue graduate
studies at Yale.
 R. F. & G. M. – What attracted you to the classical pragmatic thinkers?
Richard  J.  BERNSTEIN –  I  was  originally  attracted  to  Dewey’s  rich  conception  of
experience  and  his  commitment  to  radical  participatory  deliberative  democracy.
Dewey  led  me  to  see  the  importance  of  Hegel  for  understanding  pragmatism.
Recently Jeffrey Stout has written an excellent and perceptive comprehensive critical
review of my work and he labels me a “Hegelian pragmatist.”2 I read Experience and
Nature as  Dewey’s  attempt  to  naturalize  Hegel  in  light  of  Darwin’s  approach  to
evolution. There is an anecdote that I would like to tell about my early interest in
Dewey’s metaphysics of experience. My first professional philosophical paper that I
presented at the American Philosophical Association was based on my dissertation. I
criticized Dewey for not reconciling two strands in his work – a more naturalistic and
a more phenomenological strand. John Herman Randall was the chair of this session
and he had already written about Dewey’s metaphysics. I thought he would severely
criticize  my  paper.  But  he  liked  my  paper  (even  though  we  disagreed)  and  he
published it in the Journal of Philosophy.  As you may know that paper is still being
discussed and criticized by Dewey scholars – right up to the present. “John Dewey’s
Metaphysics of Experience” (1961) was my first publication in a philosophical journal.
 R. F. & G. M. – Do you still think there is any room for metaphysics in pragmatism?
Richard J. BERNSTEIN – “Metaphysics” is a term which has had a bad press in some
circles.  It  suggests  the possibility of  a  “transcendent metaphysics” –  the study of
what is ultimately real. And, of course, there is a great popularity of the expression
“post-metaphysical.”  Clearly  all  the  classical  pragmatic  thinkers  opposed
“transcendent  metaphysics”  and  what  Dewey  called  the  “quest  for  certainty.”
Pragmatists are some of the sharpest critics of traditional metaphysics. But there is
another more open generic sense of metaphysics. All philosophers have some sense
of  what  there  really  is  –  of  what  reality  is  like  (even  if  they  don’t  speak  of
metaphysics). Dewey intended to identify what he took to be the generic traits of
existence  and  experience.  He  did  not  claim  finality  or  some  special  philosophic
knowledge of reality. Nor did he accept a fixed distinction between appearance and
reality.
I might also mention that I was editor of the Review of Metaphysics – a journal founded
by Paul Weiss. I was appointed as the successor to Weiss. What was distinctive about
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the Review is that it was a genuinely pluralistic journal. We published translations of
Heidegger as well as Quine, Sellars and Rorty and Leo Strauss.
 R. F. & G. M. – How long were you editor of the Review of Metaphysics?
Richard J. BERNSTEIN – When Paul Weiss appointed me editor he told me to edit it as
long as I was learning something and enjoying the experience. The Review functioned
in a very unique way. The editor read all the submitted manuscripts and made all the
decisions about publication. And the editor also wrote a personal letter about each
manuscript submitted. I was assistant editor from 1961-1964 and editor from 1964
until  1971. I  was reading almost 400 manuscripts a year. I  decided to give up the
editorship in 1971 because I followed Paul’s advice. I was not interested simply in the
prestige and power of being the editor of a philosophical journal that had one of the
largest  circulations.  I  enjoyed  being  editor  and  learned  a  great  deal  from  the
experience but I went on to other projects. In 1981 I became a founding editor of
Praxis International.
 R. F. & G. M. – If you don’t call yourself a pragmatist, what is your place in the pragmatic
tradition?
Richard  J.  BERNSTEIN –  I  have  been  inspired  by  the  classical  American  pragmatic
thinkers.  But  I  think  that  a  pragmatic  orientation  requires  openness  to  other
approaches  and  other  traditions.  I  have  tried  to  practice  this  openness  in  my
encounters with thinkers in the Anglo-American tradition as well as the Continental
tradition. In my book, The Pragmatic Turn (2010) I argued that pragmatic themes have
become  fundamental  in  much  of  philosophy  today.  Pragmatism  is  more widely
discussed today than at any time in the past.
 R. F.  & G.  M.  – Some people say that there is a canon in American philosophy. And the
canon is formed by seven thinkers: Peirce, James, Dewey, Mead, Royce, Whitehead, and
Santayana.
Richard  J.  BERNSTEIN –  Although  I  think  all  of  the  above  have  made  interesting
philosophical contributions, I strongly object to the idea of a fixed canon. The truth is
that from its very origins there have been arguments about who is and who is not a
pragmatist. Furthermore, close analysis of the seven philosophers mentioned above
shows how radically different they are from each other. There have been arguments
about  what  –  if  anything  –  is  distinctive  about  American  philosophy.  What  is
mistaken about “canon” thinking is that it leaves out many important figures such as
Jane Addams and Alain Locke who have made important contributions to American
philosophy.  It  also  leaves  out  important  figure  such as  Quine,  Sellars,  Rorty,  and
Brandom. If we are to be true to what is best in the American tradition, then we
should  be  skeptical  about  any  fixed  canon  and  to  be  open  and  sensitive  to  new
developments. Or you might say that the “canon” is always being rewritten in light of
new developments.
 R. F. & G. M. – What do you consider to be pragmatic in your philosophy?
Richard J. BERNSTEIN – At different times in my career I have attempted to identify
characteristic  themes in the pragmatic  tradition that  I  share.  For example in the
presidential address that I gave to the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical
Association,  “Pragmatism,  Pluralism,  and  the  Healing  of  Wounds”3 I  listed  the
following  interrelated  themes  that  characterize  the  pragmatic  ethos:  anti-
foundationalism;  fallibilism;  the  nurturing  of  critical  communities  of  inquirers;
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radical contingency; and pluralism. Different pragmatic thinkers have approached
these themes in different ways. I have developed all of these themes in my work. In
the prologue to The Pragmatic Turn, I argue that we can detect pragmatic themes in
Wittgenstein and Heidegger. I also subscribe to Dewey’s idea of radical democracy as
a way of life in which all share and all participate.
 R. F. & G. M. – The conviction that seems to be at the heart of your work is the ability to
open pragmatic traditions to all kinds of multiple conversations. It is still an open question
whether the twentieth century can be characterized as The Pragmatic Century – as you
claim.  For  some  thinkers  there  is  a  dialectical  tension  between  pragmatist  and  the
pragmatic. Do you think there is a distinctive contribution of pragmatists to the pragmatic
tradition?
Richard J. BERNSTEIN – If I understand the gist of your question, I want answer that the
classical pragmatists have something to contribute to a larger pragmatic tradition.
The classical  pragmatists  were all  robust  non-reductive naturalists.  They were all
influenced by Darwin. We also need to realize that the philosophic writings of Peirce,
James,  Dewey and Mead include  far  more  than their  focus  on specific  pragmatic
theses. I think it is an accident of history that we use the label “pragmatic” to identify
these  thinkers.  We  should  recall  that  Peirce  did  not  even  use  the  expression
“pragmatism” until  James  published  his  famous  essay  “Philosophical  Conceptions
and Practical Results” in 1898. And Dewey thought of himself primarily as advocating
an experimental philosophy. I have suggested that “pragmatism” is like an accordion
expression. Sometimes it is used in a very broad sense to label these thinkers. Other
times it is used more narrowly to focus on their theories of meaning and truth. The
classical pragmatic thinkers did not see any fixed distinction between philosophy and
science. Furthermore, they did not see any sharp ontological breaks in the world.
Now if we consider the European phenomenological tradition going back to Husserl
there  is  a  critique  of  naturalism.  But  the  naturalism  that  Husserl  criticizes  is  a
reductive naturalism. I consider my own work in the pragmatic tradition of robust
non-reductive naturalism. I  am also skeptical  of  those who want to draw a sharp
distinction between science and philosophy. At different times in history there have
been important  differences  between science  and philosophy,  but  the  boundary is
fluid and changing. Philosophy should always be open to what it can learn from new
developments in all the sciences – both the natural and the social sciences. Although I
have my disagreements with Robert Brandom I am sympathetic with his attempt to
show the pragmatic motifs in Hegel, Heidegger and Wittgenstein. I don’t think there
is  a  set  of  fixed  theses  that  establishes  the  essential  core  of  pragmatism.  The
pragmatic  tradition  is  a  dynamic  one  that  includes  a  variety  of  different  voices.
Philosophers who identify themselves as pragmatists have always argued about what
constitutes the meaning of pragmatism. And these debates are still very much alive.
 R. F. & G. M. – Do you think that pragmatism (even Peirce) is more Hegelian than Kantian?
Richard  J.  BERNSTEIN –  We  need  to  distinguish  different  strands  in  the  pragmatic
tradition. There is a strong Kantian strand. We see this in Peirce, Sellars, and Putnam.
And recently Habermas has characterized himself as a “Kantian Pragmatist.” Dewey,
of course,  was much more influenced by Hegel.  And he shares Hegel’s  critique of
Kant. But even Kantian pragmatists reject many of the fundamental distinctions that
we find in Kant such as the distinction between phenomena and noumena. They also
reject Kant’s table of categories as fixed and permanent. They basically accept many
of Hegel’s criticisms of Kant. And like Hegel they emphasize the interaction of history
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and philosophy. My own sympathies are with a Hegelian approach to pragmatism.
But  we  should  not  forget  that  Hegel  himself  begins  with  appropriating  Kantian
themes – and then moving beyond them.
 R. F. & G. M. – Many themes in your work are connected with the Jewish tradition. What
has been the impact of this tradition on your work?
Richard J. BERNSTEIN – I find it difficult to give a clear answer to this question. I am a
Jew and I am proud of it. I grew up in a second generation Jewish immigrant family in
New York. I have never felt any conflict between being a Jew and an American (and a
philosopher).  At  a  certain point in my career I  became fascinated with twentieth
century Jewish intellectuals. I wanted to understand how their Jewishness affected
their intellectual work. I wrote two books dealing with this topic: Hannah Arendt and
the Jewish Question (1996) and Freud and the Legacy of Moses (1998). Both Arendt and
Freud were secular Jews.  I  argue that  Jewish questions are central  to their  work.
Although I am interested in the Jewish tradition, I am not a scholar of the Jewish
tradition. Furthermore, I am very skeptical and critical of the recent fascination with
political theology.
 R. F. & G. M. – You say that you are skeptical about political theology. Are you skeptical
about religion in general?
Richard J. BERNSTEIN – No. I do not consider myself to be a militant atheist. I am really
more agnostic.  All  of  the classical  pragmatists  appreciated the role  of  religion in
human life. They were anti-authoritarian and anti-dogmatic not anti-religious. We
need to take account of the significant role of religions in the contemporary world. I
am however distressed about the recent influence of Carl Schmitt’s conception of
political theology. I strongly object to those who think that all politics does or must
presuppose religion or theology.4 Of course the problem of world religions and the
way they influence politics has become a global issue today.
 R. F. & G. M. – Concerning democracy, what is your position about the debates concerning
communitarianism and liberalism?
Richard  J.  BERNSTEIN –  I  think  that  the  dichotomy  between  liberalism  and
communitarianism is  a  misleading one.  My position is  close to Dewey who was a
radical democrat, a radical liberal and who also appreciated the significance of public
communal debate for a creative democracy. Much of contemporary liberalism has
been a rights obsessed liberalism. Dewey was well aware that liberalism, which once
was a radical doctrine, has become rigidified and frequently used as a defense of the
status quo. And Dewey also thought that a “business mentality” was undermining
democracy. From his earliest work he attacked (in a Hegelian manner) the “liberal”
idea  of  the  isolated  individual.  Individuality  is  an  achievement and  the  quality  of
individuality is itself dependent on the type of communities in which we live. Dewey’s
vision of what democracy can become overcomes the division between liberalism and
communitarianism. And I agree with him.
 R. F. & G. M. – What has been your relationship with other contemporary philosophers who
identify with the pragmatic tradition?
Richard J. BERNSTEIN – I have been in active discussion with many other pragmatic
thinkers  including  Richard  Rorty,  Hilary  Putnam,  Robert  Brandom,  and  Jürgen
Habermas.  I  discuss  all  of  these  thinkers  in  The  Pragmatic  Turn –  and I  have had
personal  friendships  with  them.  I  knew  Dick  Rorty  for  more  than  fifty  years.
Habermas has been a close friend since the early 1970s.  We have had intellectual
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differences  and  public  debates  but  we  share  much  in  common.  I  believe  that
philosophic discussion is based upon and cultivates deep friendship.
 R. F. & G. M. – What do you think has been the most significant debates that you have had
with other philosophers?
Richard J. BERNSTEIN – Rorty and Habermas have been close intellectual and personal
friends. Concerning Rorty we have had many public exchanges on a variety of issues.
I have sometimes said that there are two Rortys – the reasonable Rorty with whom I
mostly  agree  –  and  the  outrageous  Rorty  who  loves  to  provoke.  My  deepest
disagreement with Rorty concerns our different views of democracy. Rorty emphases
“ironic liberalism” and I favor a more active participatory deliberative democracy.
Concerning Habermas, I detect a pragmatic and a more transcendental strain in his
thinking.  We  have  debated  these  issues  for  forty  years  and  I  have  sought  to
“detranscendentalize” him. Habermas is a bit too Kantian for my taste and I have
sought to press Hegelian and pragmatic critiques against him.
 R. F. & G. M. – What do you think about the current state of philosophy in America and the
future  of  philosophy  in  America?  Isn’t  there  still  a  strong  predominance  of  analytic
philosophy?
Richard J. BERNSTEIN – Frankly I find the general situation of philosophy in America
today a bit depressing. Much of this is due to the excessive professionalization of
academic  life.  Rorty  was  right  when  he  suggested  that  academic  philosophy  is
becoming  more  and  more  marginal  to  human  life  –  and  even  marginal  to  the
humanistic disciplines.  Even among analytic philosophers I  see a sharp difference
between  the  initial  stages  of  this  movement  and  the  way  it  is  practiced  today.
Whatever one’s critical evaluation of Carnap, Quine, Sellars, and Davidson one must
acknowledge  that  they  were  bold  thinkers.  And  their  views  have  important
ramifications for a wide range of philosophic issues. But much of today’s philosophic
writing is so specialized that it is difficult to see its significance or relevance. There
are of course some notable exceptions. Even among pragmatic thinkers there are now
divisions. We should remember that for all the differences among Peirce, James, and
Dewey they were engaged in conversation with each other.
 R. F. & G. M. – Do you think this situation has resulted from the specialization in analytic
philosophy?
Richard  J.  BERNSTEIN –  I  think  this  part  of  a  larger  problem  –  the  professional
specialization of academic life. And it seems to be getting worse and worse. When I
was a graduate student, one had a sense of outstanding thinkers who would have a
significant impact on philosophy – regardless of one’s orientation. I was a graduate
student  when  Wittgenstein’s  Philosophical  Investigations was  published  and  when
J. L. Austin  was  widely  discussed.  In  Germany,  Heidegger  and  Gadamer  were
influential. And one knew about the importance of Habermas even when he was a
young man. In France there was Ricœur, Derrida, and Foucault. Perhaps I am a bit
jaded but I  do not see many philosophic thinkers of their caliber today. I  am not
completely pessimistic. For I see many younger philosophers and pragmatic thinkers
who are not happy with the current situation. I don’t want to predict the future, but I
hope that the bold speculative imaginative spirit that was characteristic of the early
pragmatic thinkers will reassert itself.
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R. F. & G. M. – You mentioned “conversation” and “dialogue” as a distinctive mark of your
philosophy and your epoch. I  wonder if  you think this dialogue and conversation is still
possible on the contemporary philosophic scene.
Richard J. BERNSTEIN – You may recall the last sentence of Rorty’s Philosophy and the
Mirror of Nature: “The only point on which I insist is that philosophers’ moral concern
should be with continuing the conversation of the West, rather than with insisting
upon a  place  for  the  traditional  problems  of  modern  philosophy  within  that
conversation.” I basically agree with Rorty although I don’t think the conversation
should be limited to the “West.” Intellectually we are now living in a global world.
During my lifetime, I have had the good fortune to be in conversation with many
philosophic  friends  including Hannah Arendt,  Alasdair  MacIntyre,  Charles  Taylor,
Richard  Rorty,  Jacques  Derrida,  and  Jürgen  Habermas.  We  have  had  our
disagreements but the conversations have always been civil and fruitful. And I see
many  younger  philosophers  yearning  to  engage  in  such  conversations.  I  deeply
believe in engaged pluralism. My hope is that this spirit of engaged agonistic friendly
dialogue will mark the future of philosophy.
NOTES
1. The New Constellation: The Ethical-Political Horizon of Modernity/Postmodernity (1991).
2. Jeffrey Stout “The Spirit of Pragmatism: Bernstein’s Variations on Hegelian Themes,” Graduate
Faculty Philosophy Journal 33/1 (2012).
3. “Pragmatism, Pluralism, and the Healing of Wounds,” in The New Constellation (1991).
4. For my critique of Carl Schmitt, see my Violence Thinking without Banisters (2013). For my
critique of political theology see “Is Politics ‘Practicable’ without Religion?,” in Social Research
80/1 (2013).
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